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2009年4月22日 星期三
Global economic crisis hits German sex industry
http://www.reuters.com/news/pictures/rpSlideshows?articleId=USRTXE7QN#a=1
In Japan, even mobsters bite the recession bullet
Just like the legitimate businesses they have muscled into, Japan's mafia are being squeezed by the steepest economic downturn in decades, and as profits have plunged, management has been thinning out the ranks.
Adelstein said some gangs now resemble legitimate corporate giants.
"I am nostalgic for the old days," he said, "but I also have a distaste for it. I don?t think I?m suited for the new type of yakuza anyway."
2009年4月3日 星期五
S&P's price to 10-year average earnings (P/E10)
The number we want is the sum of the reported earnings for the previous four quarters. Since the first quarter of 2009 earnings aren't available, we'll use the Q4 2008 earnings, which, subject to revision, is $14.97 per share (as of March 31). Thus the 2008 year-end P/E ratio for the S&P 500 is the December closing price of 903.25 divided by 14.97, which gives us the stunning P/E ratio of 60.3 — the highest in the history of the S&P Composite since 1871.
The average P/E over this timeframe is only 15. In fact, at the top of the Tech Bubble in 2000, the conventional P/E ratio was a mere 30. It peaked north of 47 two years after the market topped out.
If we calculate earnings based on Standard & Poor's earnings estimate for the first quarter (again, as of March 31), the number drops to $8.18. That gives us a P/E at yesterday's close of 102.
As these examples illustrate, in times of critical importance, the conventional P/E ratio often lags the index to the point of being useless as a value indicator. "Why the lag?" you may wonder. "How can the P/E be at a record high after the price has fallen so far?" The explanation is simple. Earnings fell far faster. In fact, Q4 earnings were negative — something that has never happened before in the history of the S&P Composite.
The P/E10 RatioLegendary economist and value investor Benjamin Graham noticed the same bizarre P/E behavior during the Roaring Twenties and subsequent market crash. Graham collaborated with David Dodd to devise a more accurate way to calculate the market's value, which they discussed in their 1934 classic book, Security Analysis. They attributed the illogical P/E ratios to temporary and sometimes extreme fluctuations in the business cycle. Their solution was to divide the price by the 10-year average of earnings, which we'll call the P/E10. In recent years, Yale professor Robert Shiller, the author of Irrational Exuberance, has reintroduced the P/E10 to a wider audience of investors. As the accompanying chart illustrates, this ratio closely tracks the real (inflation-adjusted) price of the S&P Composite.
With this method, the historic P/E average is 16.3, with a March monthly average P/E10 of 13.5 and a monthly close at P/E10 of 14.2. The ratio in this chart is doubly smoothed (10-year average of earnings and monthly averages of daily closing prices). Thus the fluctuations during the month aren't especially relevant (e.g., the difference between the March average and closing P/E10).
Of course, the historic P/E10 has never flat-lined on the average. On the contrary, over the long haul it swings dramatically between the over- and under-valued ranges. If we look at the major peaks and troughs in the P/E10, we see that the high during the Tech Bubble was the all-time high of 44 in December 1999. The 1929 high of 32 comes in at a distant second. The secular bottoms in 1921, 1932, 1942 and 1982 saw P/E10 ratios in the single digits.
On HSBC
US, UK businesses. HSBC has US$272bn in loans in the US and US$313bn in loans in the UK, accounting for 62% of total loans. This compares with US$94bn in capital as of December 2008. It is worth remembering that the bank has US$64bn in commercial real-estate and construction loans in the US and UK combined, or 65% of its equity base today where writedowns are likely.
In the US book, it is worth reiterating that half is subprime lending, with average delinquency rates of 22% and all other at 5%. We should also caution that HSBC’s US credit-card loans amount to US$19bn, which grew 24% during the go-go years 2005-07 and where industry data are worsening fast here. Winding down HSBC Finance.
HSBC announced that it will stop writing new business for its consumer lending at HSBC Finance, where it had US$62bn in outstanding loans as of 2008. Where these loans are held for sale, we expect some writedowns. CEO Michael Geoghegan said in a recent conference call that ‘US credit-card unit faces a “difficult” two years as the economy deteriorates’.
With worsening economics in the US, this is likely to lead to significant losses and HSBC Finance may need support from its parent. A quote from Page 66 of the group’s annual report, ‘Based on management’s forecasts, HSBC expects to provide capital support to its US operations in each of the next three years’.
大龍鳳
By Francesco Guerrera in New York and Krishna Guha in Washington
Published: April 2 2009 23:20 Last updated: April 2 2009 23:57
US banks that have received government aid, including Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and JPMorgan Chase, are considering buying toxic assets to be sold by rivals under the Treasury’s $1,000bn (£680bn) plan to revive the financial system.
The plans proved controversial, with critics charging that the government’s public-private partnership - which provide generous loans to investors - are intended to help banks sell, rather than acquire, troubled securities and loans.
Spencer Bachus, the top Republican on the House financial services committee, vowed after being told of the plans by the FT to introduce legislation to stop financial institutions ”gaming the system to reap taxpayer-subsidised windfalls”.
Mr Bachus added it would mark ”a new level of absurdity” if financial institutions were ”colluding to swap assets at inflated prices using taxpayers’ dollars.”
Participating in the plan as a buyer could be complicated for Citi, which has suffered billions of dollars in writedowns on mortgage-backed assets and is about to cede a 36 per cent stake to the government.
Citi declined to comment. People close to the company said it was considering whether to take part in the plan as a seller, buyer or manager of the assets, but no decision had yet been taken.
Officials want banks to sell risky assets in order to cleanse their balance sheets and attract new investments from private investors, limiting the need for the further government funds.
Many experts think it is essential to take these assets from leveraged institutions such as banks that are responsible for the lion’s share of lending, into the hands of unleveraged financial institutions such as traditional asset managers, where they will have much less impact on the flow of credit to the economy.
Banks have three options if they want to buy toxic assets: apply to become one of four or five fund managers that will purchase troubled securities; bid for packages of bad loans; or buy into funds set up by others. The government plan does not allow banks to buy their own assets, but there is no ban on the purchase of securities and loans sold by others.
“It’s an open programme designed to get markets going,” a Treasury official said. But he added: “It is between a bank and their supervisor whether they are healthy enough to acquire assets,” raising the possibility regulators may prevent weak banks from becoming buyers.
Wall Street executives argue that banks’ asset purchases would help achieve the second main goal of the plan: to establish prices and kick-start the market for illiquid assets.
But public opinion may not tolerate the idea of banks selling each other their bad assets. Critics say that would leave the same amount of toxic assets in the system as before, but with the government now liable for most of the losses through its provision of non-recourse loans.
Administration officials reject the criticism because banking is part of a financial system, in which the owners of bank equity - such as pension funds - are the same entitites that will be investing in toxic assets anyway. Seen this way, the plan simply helps to rearrange the location of these assets in the system in a way that is more transparent and acceptable to markets.
Goldman and Morgan Stanley have large fund management units and have pledged to increase investments in distressed assets.
This week, John Mack, Morgan Stanley’s chief executive, told staff the bank was considering how to become “one of the firms that can buy these assets and package them where your clients will have access to them”.
Goldman and JPMorgan did not comment, but bankers said they were considering buying toxic assets.